The Problem With Suing Boeing For Its 737 MAX: Consequences

Airlines and leasing companies were trying to promote competition amongst aircraft manufacturers before the sector further consolidated with Airbus buying Bombardier’s C Series and Boeing proposing a majority stake in Embraer’s commercial division. That firmly leaves the aircraft pipeline, excluding the long-term emergence of China and Russia, to an Airbus-Boeing duopoly.

It is a calculated risk for a 737 MAX buyer to sue Boeing. No matter how right the purchaser is found to be, it risks infuriating Boeing in a best case scenario. Worse is the lawsuit against Boeing from Dublin-based lessor Timaero Ireland Ltd., a subsidiary of Russia’s state-owned VEB Leasing JSC.

Timaero claimed to the federal court in Chicago this month that Boeing in this 737 MAX crisis was motivated by greed, knowingly committed fraud, has “rendered the aircraft worthless,” and “the public has lost complete confidence in the safety of the 737 MAX.”

Besides seeking $185 million in damages for its order book of 22 MAXs, Timaero asks for unspecified compensation for lost profit, and for punitive damages to be calculated at three times the amount of compensatory damages.

Timaero also wants its contract with Boeing cancelled. Airbus, knowing it is the only alternative, might not have to price so aggressively. Loss of negotiating leverage on future aircraft orders is not the sole downside for 737 MAX buyers considering legal action against Boeing. They worry about the Boeing aircraft they already operate and which will need the airframer’s support for years and potentially decades to come.

Some concerns: Boeing support not covered under contract may not eventuate, or be given at a high price. This covers not just engineering work but also other areas including regulatory, legal and if the aircraft changes owner. Previously contracted support may be provided at the minimal level of service while taking the maximum length of time permitted.

The sector is paying more attention to aftermarket support with a flurry of activity, including Boeing in 2017 establishing its own aftermarket division, Boeing Global Services, which aims to grow revenue from $14.6 billion to $50 billion within a decade. Boeing Global Services CEO Stan Deal was made CEO of Boeing Commercial Airplanes in October, replacing Kevin McAllister.

Airlines ranging in size from Southwest to Icelandair have reached compensation agreements with Boeing. There are reports numerous airlines and lessors are unhappy with Boeing offering minimal compensation, preferring to give a discount on future orders rather than upfront cash, and that Boeing is discouraging lawsuits with the quip that only lawyers win. Turkey’s Demirören said Turkish Airlines was preparing a lawsuit.

Timaero makes statements Boeing has already agreed with or which could be fair. But there are also sweeping views Boeing may find contentious. Rather than the lawsuit be a formula for more MAX buyers suing Boeing, Timaero may be an outlier due to its unique commercial situation.

There is a view lessors over-ordered aircraft at the peak of the recent cycle and were eager to reduce their backlog prior to the MAX crisis. Timaero has further challenges. Parent owner VEB in 2014 placed an order for 20 MAXs, which it planned to lease to Transaero, the Russian airline that went out business in 2015. That left VEB exposed to the 20 MAXs and an order for 20 Airbus A320neos that VEB also planned to lease to Transaero. VEB increased its MAX order to 22 in 2016 by converting two 737 NGs to MAXs. Russian media say VEB made pre-delivery payments, at least 10% of contract price, on all 42 aircraft.

Timaero has received only two MAXs, at least one of which is leased to Eastar Jet in Korea via VEB. Eastar has encountered financial problems from the MAX grounding as well as the wider changes in the Korean market as a result of a downturn in travel to Japan and weaker consumer sentiment from the strengthening Korean won. Rival Jeju Air agreed in December to buy 51% of Eastar.

Timaero may be willing and able to cancel its MAX order, recoup pre-delivery payments and perhaps other costs. But other lessors as well as airlines need to receive the best outcome while continuing to have competition between Airbus and Boeing.

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I have been covering airlines and aerospace in Asia-Pacific for 10 years. I am particularly interested in aeropolitics, cross-border investments, partnerships, transformations, new revenue growth and start-ups. I am originally from New York City, graduated from the University of Melbourne, and now live in Hong Kong.

Source: The Problem With Suing Boeing For Its 737 MAX: Consequences

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Last week the Aircraft manufacturer Boeing’s apologised for two deadly crashes involving its 737 MAX model. This week a group of Indonesians whose relatives were killed in the first crash is going to be suing Boeing for compensation. An Ethiopian Airlines 737 MAX 8 crashed shortly after take-off on March 10, killing all 157 people on board. The same Boeing model was involved in a Lion Air plane crash in Indonesia in October that killed 189 people. To give us a sense of what these developments mean for the planemaker we are now joined by aviation expert from Fraymedia Desmond Latham. For more news, visit: sabcnews.com

 

Boeing Loses Patience With Muilenburg, But Calhoun May Be No More Than A Short-Term Fix As CEO

Amid mounting criticism over CEO Dennis Muilenburg’s handling of the 737 MAX crisis, Boeing on Monday said that he would be replaced by chairman and longtime board member David Calhoun.

While Calhoun may do a better public relations job than Muilenburg, some observers questioned whether he represents a real change in direction for the embattled company.

CFO Greg Smith will serve as interim CEO until Jan. 13 while Calhoun exits non-Boeing commitments.

“The Board of Directors decided that a change in leadership was necessary to restore confidence in the Company moving forward as it works to repair relationships with regulators, customers, and all other stakeholders,” the company said in a statement.

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The move comes nine months after global aviation safety regulators grounded the 737 MAX, Boeing’s best-selling plane, after the second of two deadly crashes. Muilenburg has been faulted for a leaden public response to the crisis, angering the families of the deceased, lawmakers and members of the public with his reluctance to acknowledge that faults with the plane’s flight control system were responsible for the crashes, which killed 346.

Under Muilenburg’s leadership, Boeing repeatedly promised airlines and investors that it was near winning approval for fixes for the flight control system and other changes that would allow the plane to return to service.

Two weeks ago, Muilenburg was upbraided by FAA Administrator Stephen Dickson, who summoned Boeing’s CEO to a meeting in Washington to address concerns that the company was attempting to publicly pressure the agency to move more quickly.

Last week, Boeing announced it would halt 737 production in January, with roughly 400 planes in storage that it had produced since March that it has been unable to deliver to customers.

Calhoun is well-respected, having spent 26 years as an executive at Jack Welch-era General Electric, including a stint running the aircraft engines unit, and he helped guide Caterpillar through a delicate time recently as chairman of the board when the heavy machinery maker was under investigation by the IRS over its accounting and facing troubles in China.

A much more comfortable speaker, Calhoun should be a more effective face for the company than Muilenburg with Congress and the public, and help improve its strained relationship with airlines and the FAA.

While that might be a solution for Boeing’s short-term problems, Richard Aboulafia, an aerospace analyst with Teal Group, cautions that Calhoun’s recent experience doesn’t lend confidence that he has the skills Boeing needs long-term. Calhoun has spent the past five years in private equity as a managing director at Blackstone Group, and before that eight years as head of the market research firm Nielsen. “[It] is perhaps the wrong toolkit for an engineering company that needs to restore its capabilities and reputation,” he says.

Given that Calhoun has been on Boeing’s board since 2009, it’s questionable whether he can offer a fresh approach, analyst Ronald Epstein of Bank of America/Merrill Lynch wrote in a client note. “We wonder if appointing from within, especially an insider that has been with the company for 10 years, signals more of the same from Boeing vs. an outside appointee who may have offered more of a change of pace and culture.”

Calhoun, who was appointed chairman in October when the title was stripped from Muilenburg, will be replaced as chairman by Lawrence Kellner, a board member since 2011 who was CEO of Continental Airlines from 2004 through 2009.

Boeing has a mandatory retirement age of 65 and Calhoun is 62. While the board could be amenable to giving Calhoun an extension, CFO Smith may be in position to take the job eventually, says Jeffrey Sonnenfeld, a professor at the Yale School of Management. “This gives him runway to be an appropriate successor.”

Boeing shares rose 2.9% to close at $337.55 on Monday on the New York Stock Exchange.

It’s an abrupt end for Muilenburg, who spent his entire 34-year career at Boeing, starting as an intern and rising to run the defense division before he was tapped to become CEO in 2015.

Until this spring, Boeing seemed to be going from strength to strength on Muilenburg’s watch, riding a boom in aircraft orders amid a historic expansion in air travel. Like his predecessors Jim McNerney and Harry Stonecipher, Muilenburg rewarded shareholders handsomely, devoting roughly 95% of operating cash flow to the company’s steadily rising dividend and share buybacks. Boeing shares climbed fourfold from February 2016 to a peak of $446 at the beginning of March, compared with a 63% rise for the Dow industrials over the same period.

However, critics have charged that the focus on financials has served to erode the primacy that engineering concerns used to have at the company.

The seeds of the 737 MAX crisis were sown well before Muilenburg was involved with the commercial airplanes division, with the decision in 2011 by Boeing to develop an updated version of the aging 737 with larger, more efficient engines rather than build an all-new single-aisle plane. Those larger engines changed how the 737 handled, prompting Boeing to develop software called the maneuvering characteristics augmentation system (MCAS) to automatically push the plane’s nose down in certain situations. MCAS’ design flaws are believed to be primary causes of the two deadly crashes in Indonesia and Ethiopia.

However, Boeing’s response to the crisis has been seen as squarely Muilenburg’s responsibility. He came under fire for public statements that were seen as scripted, lawyerly and lacking in empathy for the families of the deceased. Airlines and regulators have accused Boeing of being slow to share information, including the fact that the company knew in 2017 that an alert wasn’t working on most MAX aircraft that was intended to warn of a disagreement between the plane’s angle of attack sensors, which played a key role in the crashes.

It’s indicative of a corporate identity that under Muilenburg’s leadership “has been less than humble,” analyst Robert Stallard of Vertical Research wrote in a client note Monday, pointing also to the decision to raise production of the 787 Dreamliner to 14 planes a month, which has been walked back, and a strategy that seemed to assume that the historic boom-bust pattern of the aerospace sector is a thing of the past.

Muilenburg was widely seen as on his way out, with the ideal scenario being that he would depart sometime after the 737 MAX had returned to service. But with commentators increasingly calling for Muilenburg’s head last week following the announcement that the company would idle 737 production, the company suffered a stinging embarrassment Friday when a test launch of its Starliner space capsule went awry. Because a timer was set incorrectly, it was unable to reach an orbit to rendezvous as planned with the International Space Station.

The union representing Boeing engineers welcomed the leadership transition, saying in a statement that under Muilenburg, the company’s reputation for quality had “been unquestionably tarnished.”

Michael Stumo, who has become a prominent critic of Boeing since his daughter Samya Stumo’s death in the Ethiopia crash, said, “Mr. Muilenburg’s resignation is a good first step toward restoring Boeing to a company that focuses on safety and innovation.” He called for “underperforming or underqualified” board members to resign as well.

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CNBC’s Phil LeBeau reports that Boeing’s board removed CEO Dennis Muilenburg as chairman so he can focus on running the company after the 737 Max crisis.

 

 

Boeing To Halt 737 Output In January In Move That Will Strain Its Supply Chain

Since the grounding of the 737 MAX following the second of two deadly crashes in March, Boeing has sought to keep the production line moving and to minimize disruptions to the intricate web of smaller companies it relies on to supply roughly 80% of the components that make up its best-selling plane. However, with the Chicago-based company’s hopes dashed of winning approval by year-end for the 737 MAX to return to service, it has decided to halt assembly of the plane in January.

That could have far-reaching consequences for Boeing’s suppliers depending on the duration of the production freeze. The company didn’t address how long it could last.

“This decision is driven by a number of factors, including the extension of certification into 2020, the uncertainty about the timing and conditions of return to service and global training approvals, and the importance of ensuring that we can prioritize the delivery of stored aircraft,” the plane maker said in a statement Monday evening.

No layoffs are planned. The company said that the 12,000 workers at its Renton, Washington, factory will continue 737-related work or will be temporarily reassigned to other factories in the Puget Sound area.

Layoffs or furloughs could be forthcoming, however, at some suppliers. Among those that could face the greatest stresses are its aerostructures suppliers, chiefly Spirit AeroSystems, which makes the fuselage for the 737 MAX, analysts say.

The airframe is the largest portion of a plane, but building it is one-off work, with none of the highly profitable maintenance and repair sales that suppliers of other components enjoy. And smaller aerostructures suppliers have been left financially stressed as they tooled up to prepare to raise production of the 737 MAX while Boeing stretched out payment terms to 90 to 120 days, says Kevin Michaels, a consultant with Aerodynamic Advisory.

If it’s more than a one-month production pause, “Boeing and Spirit would need to be prepared to intervene to make sure small, vulnerable suppliers are there on the other side of this,” he says.

Boeing has been burning through $5.5 billion a quarter as it has built roughly 400 737 MAX aircraft it can’t deliver because of the worldwide grounding of the plane, and its balance sheet can no longer sustain that rate of spending, Bank of America/Merrill Lynch analyst Ronald Epstein said in a research note earlier Monday.

No deliveries means precious little revenue for Boeing: It typically only collects 1% to 5% of the purchase price of a plane as a down payment, with the final 50% due on delivery and the balance coming in payments as the delivery date approaches.

The darkening skies for airlines also were likely a factor in Boeing’s decision to halt output. Airlines placed thousands of orders for new airplanes while passenger numbers were expanding briskly this decade, peaking at 7.6% growth in 2017. This year passenger growth has slowed sharply, to a rate of 3.4% in October, and airlines aren’t likely to go out of their way to help Boeing expedite delivery of new planes next year for fear of adding unnecessary capacity, says Richard Aboulafia, an aerospace consultant with Teal Group.

Boeing had been planning to ramp up 737 production this year from 52 planes a month to 57. Instead, in April it reduced output to 42 a month, but it had Spirit continue to build 52 fuselages a month in what may have been a concession to the more sensitive condition of aerostructures suppliers. With no aftermarket revenue, they require certainty and consistency in delivery schedules to make the business work, says Michaels. “It’s a ballet that’s choreographed,” he says.

Spirit is working with Boeing to determine what the freeze means for the company and what steps it will take to mitigate the impact, a spokesperson told Forbes. In its second-quarter earnings call, Spirit CEO Tom Gentile said the company had game-planned pausing or reducing output in the event that Boeing halted 737 production.

Spirit furloughed thousands of employees one day a week for 10 weeks over the summer to cut costs.

Another public aerostructures supplier that stands to be squeezed is Ducommun, which makes spoilers, engine inlet bulkheads and exhaust fairings for the 737 MAX using titanium that it orders 12 months in advance. The 737 accounted for roughly 16% of Ducommun’s revenue in 2018.

Boeing didn’t respond to questions on what steps it would take to support suppliers through the freeze.

If suppliers halt production, Boeing will need to pay some to keep capacity in place, says Aboulafia.

The decision to halt production rather than slow the rate promises to make it more difficult for Boeing and its suppliers to raise output when it’s over. “Think of it as a standing start versus a running start,” says Aboulafia. A complete halt “puts enormous pressure on their supply chain and makes it hard to get back to 42 a month, let alone 52 or 57.”

Layoffs would further complicate the picture given the strong job market.

General Electric and Safran, which produce the MAX’s LEAP-1B engines through their joint venture CFM International, could be forced to adjust production rates. Engine component makers could most likely handle a short production pause, but it remains the most stressed part of the supply chain, Michaels said, amid teething problems for the LEAP and Pratt & Whitney’s geared turbofan. GE and Safran might need to help out some that are dependent on the LEAP, he says.

Interiors suppliers stand to be hurt a little more than other sectors by a production halt, he says, due to the lower share of aftermarket work in their revenues, he says. Collins, Recaro, Safran and Hexcel are among the interiors suppliers on the MAX.

Boeing warned in its October earnings report that it might halt or slow production if it were unable to win approval this year from safety regulators for revisions to the 737 MAX flight controls and related training changes.

FAA Administrator Steve Dickson told the House transportation committee last week that he would not clear the plane to fly until 2020, and summoned Boeing CEO Dennis Muilenburg to a meeting in Washington to address concerns that the company was attempting to publicly pressure the agency to move more quickly.

Dickson has stated repeatedly that he has no timeline for when the 737 MAX will return to service. Boeing made no mention of a date in its statement Monday. Bank of America analyst Epstein is forecasting March 1, but warns it could slip to April or May given uncertainties on Boeing’s progress toward meeting certification requirements and regulators’ deliberate approach.

Boeing shares fell 4.3% to close at $327.00; Spirit dropped 1.6% to $78.88.

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Source: Boeing To Halt 737 Output In January In Move That Will Strain Its Supply Chain

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Dec.16 — Boeing Co. is reportedly weighing temporarily halting production of the 737 Max as regulatory clearance for the grounded jet’s return looks increasingly likely to move beyond January 2020. Bloomberg’s Benedict Kammel reports on “Bloomberg Surveillance.”

 

Airplane Deicing: The How & Why

If you’ve traveled by air in wintry weather, you’ve probably looked out your window before takeoff and seen vehicles circling the plane, spraying deicing fluid on the wings. Passengers often ask me why it’s so important to make sure the aircraft is free of snow and ice accumulation.

Not just removing, but also preventing a build-up of snow and ice on the wings and tail of an airplane is crucial for a safe take-off. A plane’s wings and rear tail component are engineered with a very specific shape in order to provide proper lift for flight. Snow and ice on these areas in essence changes their shape and disrupts the airflow across the surface, hindering the ability to create lift.

Whenever snow, ice, or even frost has accumulated on the aircraft, the pilots call on the airport deicing facility to have it removed. Deicing fluid, a mixture of a chemical called glycol and water, is generally heated and sprayed under pressure to remove ice and snow on the aircraft.

While it removes ice and snow, deicing fluid has a limited ability to prevent further ice from forming. If winter precipitation is falling, such as snow, freezing rain or sleet, further action needs to be taken to prevent ice from forming again on the aircraft before takeoff.

In these cases, anti-icing fluid is applied after the deicing process is complete. This fluid is of a higher concentration of glycol than deicing fluid. It has a freezing point well below 32 degrees Fahrenheit or zero Celsius and therefore is able to prevent the precipitation that falls into it from freezing on the plane’s surface.

Anti-icing fluid also has an additive that thickens it more than deicing fluid to help it adhere to aircraft surfaces as it speeds down the runway during takeoff.

Pilots temporarily disable the aircraft’s ventilation system during the deicing/anti-icing process to prevent fluid fumes from entering the cabin. Although the fumes are considered nontoxic for inhalation, we try to keep the odor out of the cabin regardless. Sometimes the scent, similar to maple syrup, does find its way into the aircraft cabin.

As the anti-icing fluids lose their effectiveness in flight, the aircraft is still equipped with systems that prevent frozen precipitation from building on the wings, tail and various sensors around the airplane. These systems are not only important in the winter months, but also in the summer months, because at higher altitudes, the temperature is well below freezing year-round.

Typically aircraft systems prevent ice buildup in one of two ways. On most jet aircraft, hot air from the engines is routed through piping in the wings, tail and engine openings to heat their surfaces and prevent icing.

Preventing ice formation in the engine openings is important, as ice here could dislodge and cause damage as it’s ingested into the engine. This occurrence would be similar to throwing a rock into a running washing machine — clearly not a good idea.

On propeller driven aircraft, balloon-like devices attached to the wings and tail are inflated and deflated with air from the engines, breaking up any ice accumulation.

We can’t promise your trip to the airport will be ice-free, but there won’t be any icy buildup on the plane getting you to your holiday destination.

By Daniel E. Fahl

Source: Airplane deicing: The how and why

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A snowstorm left snow piled on top of this Norwegian 737-800 bound for Copenhagen, Denmark from Oslo, Norway. The video features pushback, taxi, de-ice, and takeoff. It’s certainly not something you see everyday. Enjoy! Please LIKE & SUBSCRIBE to support my channel!

How Airlines Are Defending Dormant 737 MAX Jets From The Ravages Of Corrosion, Insects And Time

Boeing 737 MAX planes have been stuck on the ground now for five months. With the likelihood rising that they won’t return to service before the winter, some airlines may soon have to deal with the danger that the planes could literally become stuck to the ground.

Tires of planes that are parked for long periods of time can freeze to the tarmac during subzero weather, warns a Boeing maintenance manual for the previous generation of 737 aircraft. It advises maintenance workers to place sand or a coarse fiber mat under the tires and covers over the wheels and brake assemblies to protect them from the corrosive effects of rain and snow.

With the end of summer drawing closer, Air Canada is considering moving its 24 737 MAX planes south to the gentler climes of a desert storage yard, a spokesperson told Forbes. WestJet says it’s content to keep its 13 planes in Canada, spooling up the engines every week and taking them for a spin on the apron around their hangars.

Airlines have had 387 MAX planes sitting quietly at airports and storage facilities around the world since March, when the second of two horrific crashes led aviation authorities worldwide to ground Boeing’s best-selling plane. Boeing is storing roughly another 200 that it has assembled but can’t deliver.

Planes are built to move. Making sure these aren’t damaged from their prolonged grounding has become the mission of a small army of maintenance staff. The longer the planes’ wings are clipped, the more needs to be done. Among the main tools, as prescribed by the 737 manual: copious amounts of yellow 3M vinyl tape No. 471 to seal off gaps and sensors, and an array of lubricants.

Southwest Airlines, the largest operator of the 737 MAX, is storing its fleet of 34 planes in the dry heat of the high Mojave desert at an airfield in Victorville, California. Once a week, maintenance workers power up the Leap-1B engines, which their maker, CFM International, a partnership between General Electric and Safran, recommend should be idled for 15 to 20 minutes to vaporize any moisture that may have collected in the oil and fuel systems and to cover engine parts with a new coat of oil to prevent corrosion. Southwest technicians also boot up the flight computers and auxiliary power units weekly.

The doors of planes stored in the desert are generally opened during summer days so the cabins aren’t damaged by the heat, says David Querio, president of Ascent Aviation Services, which operates at Pinal Airpark in Arizona, one of the largest aircraft storage yards in the world.

Birds sometimes nest on a plane, and, rarely, an animal will take advantage of an open door to take up residence inside. “They’re removed the same day if they’re stupid enough to do that,” says Querio.

As the timeline for the 737 MAX’s return has receded further over the past few weeks, some airlines could decide to put their planes into a state of deeper storage, with the engines preserved and batteries and other sensitive parts removed, says Tim Zemanovic, president of the Minnesota aircraft disassembly firm Fillmore Aviation. Because it requires fewer regular maintenance tasks, this type of storage generally runs half the cost of active storage, at roughly $1,000 a month per plane, he says, but it means it would take more time to ready the planes to fly again when aviation regulators sign off on Boeing’s fixes for the 737 MAX.

In long-term storage, the engines, the single most valuable part on an airliner, are “pickled”: The oil is drained and replaced with an oil mixed with a corrosion prevention solution, and desiccant bags—larger versions of the moisture-removing silica packets put in consumer goods—are placed in the inlets, with gauges that monitor humidity levels. Then the ends are covered to keep out the elements, animals and insects, says Zemanovic, who used to run a storage and maintenance facility at Pinal Airpark.

When planes are dormant for more than two months, Boeing’s 737 maintenance manual calls for gaps in the fuselage to be sealed with vinyl tape and screens placed over drain holes. A protective coating is sprayed onto unpainted metal surfaces. The cabins go dark, with the window shades closed and cockpit windshields covered with aluminum foil tape or other reflective material. Cotton covers are put over the seats and runners protect the carpets.

Planes at a storage yard typically get visited at least once a day to make sure the exterior coverings are intact, says Querio.

The 737 manual lays out a schedule of maintenance procedures to be done at regular intervals that’s heavy on lubrication of myriad parts.

Every week the plane should be scanned for corrosion; every two weeks, electrical systems powered up for two hours. Every 30 days the plane should be moved a third of a wheel’s turn, to prevent the tires from getting flat spots; carpets and seats checked for mildew; and water drained from the sumps of fuel tanks to prevent growth of bacteria or fungi, which can have the consistency of mayonnaise and plug fuel filters.

Every 90 days, the flaps, rudder and other control services need to be exercised.

If the grounding extends to a year, the landing gear may need to be flexed, says Zemanovic, with the plane propped up on giant jacks placed under the wings and the nose. Boeing and Airbus recommend that some models should be restored to operating condition after a year before being shut down again, says Querio.

Boeing expects aviation regulators to sign off on its fixes for the 737 MAX and a revised training regime early in the fourth quarter, but given previous delays and new technical issues that have arisen over the past few months, some industry watchers think the plane’s return to service could slip further. Southwest Airlines has taken the 737 MAX off its flight schedule till January 5; Air Canada has scrubbed the plane through January 8.

A Southwest spokesman said that once the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration declares the model airworthy, the airline expects it will take 120 hours of work on each plane to get them ready to fly again, and 30 to 60 days for the airline’s whole fleet.

One giant task: cleaning the planes. Dust can collect inside planes stored in the desert if the doors are vented, requiring a thorough vacuuming, says Zemanovic, and if the storage facility doesn’t have a concrete wash pad with drains to properly dispose of large amounts of soapy water, workers may have no choice but to wipe down the plane by hand, a laborious process that he says could require a “couple hundred” man hours. Two necessities for the job: 27-foot high work platforms and a mammoth supply of cleaning wipes.

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Source: How Airlines Are Defending Dormant 737 MAX Jets From The Ravages Of Corrosion, Insects And Time

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