Boeing Loses Patience With Muilenburg, But Calhoun May Be No More Than A Short-Term Fix As CEO

Amid mounting criticism over CEO Dennis Muilenburg’s handling of the 737 MAX crisis, Boeing on Monday said that he would be replaced by chairman and longtime board member David Calhoun.

While Calhoun may do a better public relations job than Muilenburg, some observers questioned whether he represents a real change in direction for the embattled company.

CFO Greg Smith will serve as interim CEO until Jan. 13 while Calhoun exits non-Boeing commitments.

“The Board of Directors decided that a change in leadership was necessary to restore confidence in the Company moving forward as it works to repair relationships with regulators, customers, and all other stakeholders,” the company said in a statement.

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The move comes nine months after global aviation safety regulators grounded the 737 MAX, Boeing’s best-selling plane, after the second of two deadly crashes. Muilenburg has been faulted for a leaden public response to the crisis, angering the families of the deceased, lawmakers and members of the public with his reluctance to acknowledge that faults with the plane’s flight control system were responsible for the crashes, which killed 346.

Under Muilenburg’s leadership, Boeing repeatedly promised airlines and investors that it was near winning approval for fixes for the flight control system and other changes that would allow the plane to return to service.

Two weeks ago, Muilenburg was upbraided by FAA Administrator Stephen Dickson, who summoned Boeing’s CEO to a meeting in Washington to address concerns that the company was attempting to publicly pressure the agency to move more quickly.

Last week, Boeing announced it would halt 737 production in January, with roughly 400 planes in storage that it had produced since March that it has been unable to deliver to customers.

Calhoun is well-respected, having spent 26 years as an executive at Jack Welch-era General Electric, including a stint running the aircraft engines unit, and he helped guide Caterpillar through a delicate time recently as chairman of the board when the heavy machinery maker was under investigation by the IRS over its accounting and facing troubles in China.

A much more comfortable speaker, Calhoun should be a more effective face for the company than Muilenburg with Congress and the public, and help improve its strained relationship with airlines and the FAA.

While that might be a solution for Boeing’s short-term problems, Richard Aboulafia, an aerospace analyst with Teal Group, cautions that Calhoun’s recent experience doesn’t lend confidence that he has the skills Boeing needs long-term. Calhoun has spent the past five years in private equity as a managing director at Blackstone Group, and before that eight years as head of the market research firm Nielsen. “[It] is perhaps the wrong toolkit for an engineering company that needs to restore its capabilities and reputation,” he says.

Given that Calhoun has been on Boeing’s board since 2009, it’s questionable whether he can offer a fresh approach, analyst Ronald Epstein of Bank of America/Merrill Lynch wrote in a client note. “We wonder if appointing from within, especially an insider that has been with the company for 10 years, signals more of the same from Boeing vs. an outside appointee who may have offered more of a change of pace and culture.”

Calhoun, who was appointed chairman in October when the title was stripped from Muilenburg, will be replaced as chairman by Lawrence Kellner, a board member since 2011 who was CEO of Continental Airlines from 2004 through 2009.

Boeing has a mandatory retirement age of 65 and Calhoun is 62. While the board could be amenable to giving Calhoun an extension, CFO Smith may be in position to take the job eventually, says Jeffrey Sonnenfeld, a professor at the Yale School of Management. “This gives him runway to be an appropriate successor.”

Boeing shares rose 2.9% to close at $337.55 on Monday on the New York Stock Exchange.

It’s an abrupt end for Muilenburg, who spent his entire 34-year career at Boeing, starting as an intern and rising to run the defense division before he was tapped to become CEO in 2015.

Until this spring, Boeing seemed to be going from strength to strength on Muilenburg’s watch, riding a boom in aircraft orders amid a historic expansion in air travel. Like his predecessors Jim McNerney and Harry Stonecipher, Muilenburg rewarded shareholders handsomely, devoting roughly 95% of operating cash flow to the company’s steadily rising dividend and share buybacks. Boeing shares climbed fourfold from February 2016 to a peak of $446 at the beginning of March, compared with a 63% rise for the Dow industrials over the same period.

However, critics have charged that the focus on financials has served to erode the primacy that engineering concerns used to have at the company.

The seeds of the 737 MAX crisis were sown well before Muilenburg was involved with the commercial airplanes division, with the decision in 2011 by Boeing to develop an updated version of the aging 737 with larger, more efficient engines rather than build an all-new single-aisle plane. Those larger engines changed how the 737 handled, prompting Boeing to develop software called the maneuvering characteristics augmentation system (MCAS) to automatically push the plane’s nose down in certain situations. MCAS’ design flaws are believed to be primary causes of the two deadly crashes in Indonesia and Ethiopia.

However, Boeing’s response to the crisis has been seen as squarely Muilenburg’s responsibility. He came under fire for public statements that were seen as scripted, lawyerly and lacking in empathy for the families of the deceased. Airlines and regulators have accused Boeing of being slow to share information, including the fact that the company knew in 2017 that an alert wasn’t working on most MAX aircraft that was intended to warn of a disagreement between the plane’s angle of attack sensors, which played a key role in the crashes.

It’s indicative of a corporate identity that under Muilenburg’s leadership “has been less than humble,” analyst Robert Stallard of Vertical Research wrote in a client note Monday, pointing also to the decision to raise production of the 787 Dreamliner to 14 planes a month, which has been walked back, and a strategy that seemed to assume that the historic boom-bust pattern of the aerospace sector is a thing of the past.

Muilenburg was widely seen as on his way out, with the ideal scenario being that he would depart sometime after the 737 MAX had returned to service. But with commentators increasingly calling for Muilenburg’s head last week following the announcement that the company would idle 737 production, the company suffered a stinging embarrassment Friday when a test launch of its Starliner space capsule went awry. Because a timer was set incorrectly, it was unable to reach an orbit to rendezvous as planned with the International Space Station.

The union representing Boeing engineers welcomed the leadership transition, saying in a statement that under Muilenburg, the company’s reputation for quality had “been unquestionably tarnished.”

Michael Stumo, who has become a prominent critic of Boeing since his daughter Samya Stumo’s death in the Ethiopia crash, said, “Mr. Muilenburg’s resignation is a good first step toward restoring Boeing to a company that focuses on safety and innovation.” He called for “underperforming or underqualified” board members to resign as well.

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CNBC’s Phil LeBeau reports that Boeing’s board removed CEO Dennis Muilenburg as chairman so he can focus on running the company after the 737 Max crisis.

 

 

Boeing To Halt 737 Output In January In Move That Will Strain Its Supply Chain

Since the grounding of the 737 MAX following the second of two deadly crashes in March, Boeing has sought to keep the production line moving and to minimize disruptions to the intricate web of smaller companies it relies on to supply roughly 80% of the components that make up its best-selling plane. However, with the Chicago-based company’s hopes dashed of winning approval by year-end for the 737 MAX to return to service, it has decided to halt assembly of the plane in January.

That could have far-reaching consequences for Boeing’s suppliers depending on the duration of the production freeze. The company didn’t address how long it could last.

“This decision is driven by a number of factors, including the extension of certification into 2020, the uncertainty about the timing and conditions of return to service and global training approvals, and the importance of ensuring that we can prioritize the delivery of stored aircraft,” the plane maker said in a statement Monday evening.

No layoffs are planned. The company said that the 12,000 workers at its Renton, Washington, factory will continue 737-related work or will be temporarily reassigned to other factories in the Puget Sound area.

Layoffs or furloughs could be forthcoming, however, at some suppliers. Among those that could face the greatest stresses are its aerostructures suppliers, chiefly Spirit AeroSystems, which makes the fuselage for the 737 MAX, analysts say.

The airframe is the largest portion of a plane, but building it is one-off work, with none of the highly profitable maintenance and repair sales that suppliers of other components enjoy. And smaller aerostructures suppliers have been left financially stressed as they tooled up to prepare to raise production of the 737 MAX while Boeing stretched out payment terms to 90 to 120 days, says Kevin Michaels, a consultant with Aerodynamic Advisory.

If it’s more than a one-month production pause, “Boeing and Spirit would need to be prepared to intervene to make sure small, vulnerable suppliers are there on the other side of this,” he says.

Boeing has been burning through $5.5 billion a quarter as it has built roughly 400 737 MAX aircraft it can’t deliver because of the worldwide grounding of the plane, and its balance sheet can no longer sustain that rate of spending, Bank of America/Merrill Lynch analyst Ronald Epstein said in a research note earlier Monday.

No deliveries means precious little revenue for Boeing: It typically only collects 1% to 5% of the purchase price of a plane as a down payment, with the final 50% due on delivery and the balance coming in payments as the delivery date approaches.

The darkening skies for airlines also were likely a factor in Boeing’s decision to halt output. Airlines placed thousands of orders for new airplanes while passenger numbers were expanding briskly this decade, peaking at 7.6% growth in 2017. This year passenger growth has slowed sharply, to a rate of 3.4% in October, and airlines aren’t likely to go out of their way to help Boeing expedite delivery of new planes next year for fear of adding unnecessary capacity, says Richard Aboulafia, an aerospace consultant with Teal Group.

Boeing had been planning to ramp up 737 production this year from 52 planes a month to 57. Instead, in April it reduced output to 42 a month, but it had Spirit continue to build 52 fuselages a month in what may have been a concession to the more sensitive condition of aerostructures suppliers. With no aftermarket revenue, they require certainty and consistency in delivery schedules to make the business work, says Michaels. “It’s a ballet that’s choreographed,” he says.

Spirit is working with Boeing to determine what the freeze means for the company and what steps it will take to mitigate the impact, a spokesperson told Forbes. In its second-quarter earnings call, Spirit CEO Tom Gentile said the company had game-planned pausing or reducing output in the event that Boeing halted 737 production.

Spirit furloughed thousands of employees one day a week for 10 weeks over the summer to cut costs.

Another public aerostructures supplier that stands to be squeezed is Ducommun, which makes spoilers, engine inlet bulkheads and exhaust fairings for the 737 MAX using titanium that it orders 12 months in advance. The 737 accounted for roughly 16% of Ducommun’s revenue in 2018.

Boeing didn’t respond to questions on what steps it would take to support suppliers through the freeze.

If suppliers halt production, Boeing will need to pay some to keep capacity in place, says Aboulafia.

The decision to halt production rather than slow the rate promises to make it more difficult for Boeing and its suppliers to raise output when it’s over. “Think of it as a standing start versus a running start,” says Aboulafia. A complete halt “puts enormous pressure on their supply chain and makes it hard to get back to 42 a month, let alone 52 or 57.”

Layoffs would further complicate the picture given the strong job market.

General Electric and Safran, which produce the MAX’s LEAP-1B engines through their joint venture CFM International, could be forced to adjust production rates. Engine component makers could most likely handle a short production pause, but it remains the most stressed part of the supply chain, Michaels said, amid teething problems for the LEAP and Pratt & Whitney’s geared turbofan. GE and Safran might need to help out some that are dependent on the LEAP, he says.

Interiors suppliers stand to be hurt a little more than other sectors by a production halt, he says, due to the lower share of aftermarket work in their revenues, he says. Collins, Recaro, Safran and Hexcel are among the interiors suppliers on the MAX.

Boeing warned in its October earnings report that it might halt or slow production if it were unable to win approval this year from safety regulators for revisions to the 737 MAX flight controls and related training changes.

FAA Administrator Steve Dickson told the House transportation committee last week that he would not clear the plane to fly until 2020, and summoned Boeing CEO Dennis Muilenburg to a meeting in Washington to address concerns that the company was attempting to publicly pressure the agency to move more quickly.

Dickson has stated repeatedly that he has no timeline for when the 737 MAX will return to service. Boeing made no mention of a date in its statement Monday. Bank of America analyst Epstein is forecasting March 1, but warns it could slip to April or May given uncertainties on Boeing’s progress toward meeting certification requirements and regulators’ deliberate approach.

Boeing shares fell 4.3% to close at $327.00; Spirit dropped 1.6% to $78.88.

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Source: Boeing To Halt 737 Output In January In Move That Will Strain Its Supply Chain

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Dec.16 — Boeing Co. is reportedly weighing temporarily halting production of the 737 Max as regulatory clearance for the grounded jet’s return looks increasingly likely to move beyond January 2020. Bloomberg’s Benedict Kammel reports on “Bloomberg Surveillance.”

 

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